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ABSTRACT
A number of writers have recently questioned whether labor productivity or per capita
incomes were ever higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States. We show that although
the United States already had a substantial labor productivity lead in industry as early as 1840,
especially in manufacturing, labor productivity was broadly equal in the two countries in agriculture,
while the United Kingdom was ahead in services. Hence aggregate labor productivity was higher
in the United Kingdom, particularly since the United States had a larger share of the labor force in
low value-added agriculture. U.S. overtaking occurred decisively only during the 1890s, as labor
productivity pulled ahead in services and the share of agricultural employment declined
substantially. Labor force participation was lower in the United States, so that the United Kingdom’s
labor productivity advantage in the mid-nineteenth century translated into a larger per capita income
lead.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A number of writers have recently questioned whether labor productivity and per 
capita incomes were ever higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States 
(Prados de la Escosura, 2000; Ward and Devereux, 2003). Although previous work by 
Broadberry (1998) calculated sectoral differences in output per worker in the United 
Kingdom and the United States from 1870 to 1990, and confirmed that US overtaking 
occurred during the 1890s, this work was based on time series projections from a 
1937 benchmark. That study was able to check the time series projections against a 
sectoral benchmark for 1910, but no attempt was made to provide any additional 
checks for the nineteenth century.  
 
  This paper addresses more directly the issue of comparative productivity 
levels in the United Kingdom and the United States during the nineteenth century, by 
using time series projection from a 1910 benchmark, and using an 1850 benchmark as 
an additional cross-check. We provide results for the period from 1910 back to 1840 
for the overall economy together with a full three-sector breakdown for the period 
1840-1910, based on agriculture, industry, and services, as well as a more detailed 
breakdown of industry into manufacturing, mining and construction. However, due to 
limitations in the pre-1870 data, we have provided a more detailed breakdown of 
comparative productivity in the service sector into transport and public utilities, 
distribution, other private services and government, only for the period 1870-1910.  
 
We show that although the United States already had a substantial labor 
productivity lead in industry as early as 1840, especially in manufacturing, labor 
productivity was broadly equal in the two countries in agriculture, while the United   3
Kingdom was ahead in services. Hence aggregate labor productivity was higher in the 
United Kingdom, particularly since the United States had a larger share of the labor 
force in low value-added agriculture. U.S. overtaking occurred decisively only during 
the 1890s, as labor productivity pulled ahead in services and the share of agricultural 
employment declined substantially.  
 
In addition, the proportion of the population in the labor force was higher in 
the United Kingdom than in the United States, reinforcing the U.K.’s per capita 
income lead that resulted from its labor productivity advantage in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  The rise in the share of the population in the U.S. labor force after 1880, as 
well as the improvement in overall labor productivity, enabled the United States to 
attain per capita income leadership early in the twentieth century. 
 
II. COMPARATIVE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, 1840-1910: DATA SOURCES 
AND OVERVIEW 
In this section we utilize time-series data on output and employment in the United 
Kingdom and the United States to establish comparative productivity levels back to 
circa 1840 by extrapolation from a circa 1910 benchmark. The sectors are agriculture 
(farming, fishing, forestry), industry (mining, manufacturing and construction) and 
services (including transportation and public utilities, distribution, finance and other 
private services and government). The data are provided in Appendix 1, together with 
detailed sources. 
 
1. U.S. Time Series of Output and Employment   4
Time series back to 1839 are readily available for the United States at a 10-year 
frequency from Census and other sources. For the period 1869-1909, the standard 
source is Kendrick (1961) for both output and employment. For the period 1839-1869, 
Gallman (1960) drew on Census data to calculate real value added in agriculture and 
industry, while Gallman and Weiss (1969) present data on service sector value added. 
Following Johnston (2001), the sectoral labor force data prior to 1869 are taken 
largely from Lebergott (1966), but incorporating a number of widely accepted 
corrections suggested by Weiss (1975; 1986; 1992). These figures refer to “gainful 
workers”, a broader definition than Kendrick’s (1961) concept of “persons engaged”. 
Since gainful workers includes all persons who usually followed an occupation, 
whether or not they were employed at the time of the Census, Lebergott’s total for 
employment exceeds Kendrick’s at the splice point in 1869, although the sectoral 
distribution is similar in both sources.  
 
  When possible, we have cross checked the data with other sources. For 
example, Davis’s (2004) new annual index of U.S. industrial production (starting in 
1790) accords well with that of Frickey (1947) and the path of real output in 
manufacturing suggested by Gallman (1960). We have also recalculated total output 
as a weighted average of the sectoral outputs and total employment as the sum of 
sectoral employments, to ensure that our use of additional information does not take 
us too far from the original totals for output and employment presented in the standard 
sources. 
 
2. U.K. Time Series of Output and Employment   5
For the United Kingdom, time series for output and the labor force by sector are 
readily available at a 10-year frequency for the period 1861-1911 from Feinstein 
(1972), and can be extended back to 1851 using Lewis (1978). The labor force data 
are on broadly the same basis as those of Lebergott (1966) rather than Kendrick 
(1961) for the United States. For the period 1841-1851, it is not possible to obtain 
sectoral estimates for the United Kingdom, and attention has been confined to Great 
Britain, excluding Ireland. This is potentially an important issue, since Ireland 
accounted for 30.2 per cent of the United Kingdom’s population in 1841, falling to 
23.8 per cent by 1851, after the Great Famine (Mitchell, 1988: 13). However, 
although trends in output and employment were thus very different in Ireland and 
Great Britain over this decade, it is likely that trends in productivity were far more 
similar. Although the disarray arising from the famine may be expected to have had 
an adverse effect on Irish productivity, there are also offsetting factors to consider. 
First, the decline in agricultural employment resulted in much of the most marginal 
land being taken out of production, hence boosting agricultural productivity in Ireland 
(Boyer et al., 1994). Second, Geary (1998) points out that although there was a sharp 
decline in the share of the Irish labor force employed in textiles between 1841 and 
1851, this was offset to a large extent by an increase in the share employed in other 
high-value-added manufacturing industries.  
 
Detailed sources for the United Kingdom are also given in Appendix 1. As 
with the United States, we have recalculated total output for the United Kingdom as a 
weighted average of the sectoral outputs and total employment as the sum of sectoral 
employments, to ensure that our use of additional information does not take us too far 
from the original totals for output and employment presented in the standard sources.   6
 
3. A benchmark for circa 1910 
The starting point for the time series projection, which forms the basis of our central 
results, is a benchmark estimate of comparative labor productivity by sector circa 
1910. This has been published previously with a slightly different sectoral breakdown 
in Broadberry (1997). For most sectors, the comparative labor productivity level is as 
in the earlier study, but with the utilities (gas, electricity and water) now combined 
with transport and communications to make up the transport & utilities sector.
1 
However, for the aggregate economy, a new estimate has been provided using the 
geometric mean of comparative U.S./U.K. labor productivity using value added 
weights for both countries and adjusting for (1) the different basis of the U.S. and 
U.K. employment data and (2) the ownership of dwellings.  
 
4. Comparative productivity levels by sector: an overview 
Table 1 presents the main productivity comparisons. Strictly speaking, the dates of 
comparison are 1839/41, 1849/51, etc., but we shall refer in the text to the central 
dates of 1840, 1850, etc. The first three columns are the main sectors – agriculture, 
industry, and services – followed by the economy-wide overall comparative labor 
productivity. Not surprisingly, the story from 1870 to 1910 is essentially the same as 
that in Broadberry (1998) and Broadberry and Ghosal (2002), with roughly equal 
productivity in agriculture, much higher U.S. labor productivity in industry, and a 
rapid catch-up in U.S. service sector productivity. The data again indicate that the 
United States had caught up to the U.K. economy in aggregate labor productivity 
around 1890 and exceeded it in the decades thereafter. 
                                                 
1 The U.S. data do not permit separate estimates for the utilities before 1870.   7
 
  What is new in Table 1 is the stability of the 1870 comparative productivity 
levels in the three decades prior to that year. In the economy as a whole, comparative 
labor productivity was about the same in 1840 as it was in 1870; i.e., the United States 
had about 95 percent of the U.K. level of G.D.P. per person engaged. There was no 
marked catch-up during the mid-nineteenth century; rather, the productivity gap 
appears to have been small and stable. The overall pattern of sectoral productivity 
performance seen in 1840 and 1850 was also roughly the same as it was in 1870, with 
roughly equal productivity in agriculture, a large U.S. productivity advantage in 
industry, and a large U.K. productivity advantage in services. 
 
  Thus, in terms of overall labor productivity, the United States was about as far 
behind the United Kingdom in 1840 as it had been in 1870, which is to say, not much. 
The story that emerges is one in which the United States was close behind the United 
Kingdom for much of the mid-century, only to catch up later largely as a result of a 
convergence of productivity in services and a shift of the labor force away from 
agriculture. The process of overall catch-up was not uniform throughout the century 
as there is little evidence of such catch-up between about 1840 and 1880. 
 
Table 2 sets out the sectoral composition of the labor force in the two 
countries, which sheds some light on how the comparative productivity levels in the 
individual sectors aggregate to the overall comparative productivity levels in the final 
column of Table 1. Clearly, agriculture was much more important in the United States 
than in the United Kingdom. Since value added per worker was substantially lower in 
agriculture than in industry or services in the United States, the concentration of such   8
a large share of the labor force in agriculture helps to explain how G.D.P. per worker 
was higher in the United Kingdom despite the substantial U.S. productivity lead in 
industry.
2 The proportional shift of labor out of agriculture in both countries also 
helps to explain how the United States was able to catch-up with and eventually 
overtake the United Kingdom. The falling share of labor in agriculture in the United 
Kingdom was matched largely by a rising share of labor in services. In the United 
States, however, there was also a substantial increase in the share of labor in industry. 
 
III. SECTORAL ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE PRODUCTIVITY, 1840-1910 
1. Comparative productivity in agriculture 
In agriculture, the stability of the relative productivity measure is a striking feature of 
these figures. This implies that the timing of productivity improvements in agriculture 
was broadly comparable in the two countries. In the United States, both our figures 
and those of Weiss (1993) indicate that output per worker grew slightly but was 
relatively unchanged before 1850, in line with the earlier estimates of Towne and 
Rasmussen (1960). The slowness of agricultural productivity to increase can be 
explained largely in terms of the westward movement of the frontier, expanding the 
land area under cultivation without many capital investments taking place. However, 
as Olmstead and Rhode (2002) point out, avoiding a decline in productivity should be 
regarded as an achievement, since without substantial biological changes such as the 
introduction of new varieties of wheat, yields would have fallen with the increasing 
severity of insects, diseases and weeds.  
 
                                                 
2 For example, U.S. G.D.P. per employee in 1849 was $285.5 for the whole economy but $168.3 in 
agriculture (Gallman, 1960; Johnston, 2001).   9
  After 1850, labor productivity began to increase more rapidly as 
mechanization combined with further biological improvements (Parker and Klein, 
1966; Olmstead and Rhode, 2002). However, developments in the South acted to 
offset the gains in the North, with the emancipation of slaves reducing the intensity of 
work and the breakdown of the plantation system leading to the loss of economies of 
scale (Ransom and Sutch, 1977: 45; 74-75; Fogel and Engerman, 1974: 204).  
 
  One point worth stressing is that the concept of labor productivity being 
considered here is output per worker rather than output per hour. This is important 
because as David (1996) notes, both the ratio of persons engaged to gainful workers 
and the number of hours worked per person engaged were much lower in agriculture 
than in the rest of the economy. Indeed, David (1996) calculates that the number of 
full-time equivalent manhours per gainful worker in agriculture was little more than 
half the level in the rest of the economy. This helps to explain the co-existence of 
separate literatures emphasizing on the one hand how agriculture was a backward 
sector from which surplus labor needed to be extracted to effect development and on 
the other hand how land abundance in the United States led to labor shortages in 
industry by creating a high opportunity cost for labor outside agriculture (Kuznets, 
1966; Habakkuk, 1962). In the literature inspired by Kuznets (1966), U.S. agriculture 
has low output per gainful worker, and the redeployment of labor away from 
agriculture into industry helps to raise aggregate output per worker (Broadberry, 
1998). However, in the literature inspired by Habbakuk, this is consistent with 
agriculture having high output per hour worked, in line with the assumption of land 
abundance (David, 1996). 
   10
In the United Kingdom, agricultural labor productivity kept pace with 
developments in the United States. After the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, 
agricultural output stagnated in the United Kingdom and the growing population was 
fed increasingly through imports from abroad (Afton and Turner, 2000). As the 
agricultural labor force declined, however, labor productivity continued to grow in 
line with U.S. agriculture. The high and growing level of labor productivity in U.K. 
agriculture throughout the nineteenth century can be understood in terms of  (1) the 
already low share of the labor force in agriculture during the Industrial Revolution 
(Crafts, 1985)  (2) increasing capital intensity during the “high farming” period or the 
“golden age” between the 1840s and the 1870s (Beckett, 2000: 734-741)  (3) the shift 
of the product mix away from grain towards higher value added pastoral products 
during the period of falling grain prices caused by the “grain invasion” from the 
United States from the early 1870s (Ojala, 1952; Drescher, 1955; Turner, 2000).
3  
 
2. Comparative productivity in industry 
Turning to industry, we build on the earlier findings of Broadberry (1994), who 
examined U.S./U.K. comparative labor productivity levels in manufacturing in the 
nineteenth century. The definition of industry in Table 1 includes mining and 
construction, and is therefore broader than just manufacturing. However, a similar 
pattern emerges, with a substantial U.S. labor productivity lead already established in 
industry by the mid-nineteenth century. 
 
  Table 3 presents a sectoral breakdown of the comparative productivity 
position within industry, while Table 4 shows how the labor force was distributed 
                                                 
3 In the U.K. literature, this period of falling prices from the mid-1870s to the mid-1890s is often   11
across the main industrial sectors. The largest industrial sector in both countries was 
clearly manufacturing, and comparative labor productivity in this sector follows the 
pattern analyzed in more detail in Broadberry (1994). Even as early as 1840, the 
United States had a substantial labor productivity advantage over the United 
Kingdom.  Labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing was more than twice that in 
British manufacturing in the 1840-1860 period, even higher than it was later in the 




  This large U.S. labor productivity advantage in manufacturing during the 
nineteenth century has attracted a great deal of attention since it was linked by 
Habakkuk (1962) to the abundance of land and natural resources in the United States. 
Habbakuk’s argument was that resource abundance led to labor scarcity and hence (1) 
substitution of capital for labor in manufacturing and (2) labor saving technical 
progress.
5   The first result, of resource abundance leading to greater capital intensity 
in manufacturing, goes through so long as there is a complementarity between capital 
and resources, and this has been widely accepted in the recent literature (Ames and 
Rosenberg, 1968). The second result of resource abundance leading to labor saving 
technical progress has been demonstrated by David (1975), drawing on a model of 
                                                                                                                                            
confusingly called the Great Depression (Orwin and Whetham, 1964: 240-288). 
4 The pre-1870 pattern of comparative labor productivity in manufacturing differs somewhat from that 
reported in Broadberry (1994) largely on account of changes in the employment data for both 
countries. For the United States, Lebergott’s (1966) data have been amended in line with Johnston 
(2001), while for the United Kingdom the estimates of Lewis (1978) and Deane and Cole (1967) have 
been preferred here to those of Mitchell (1988). 
5 Temin (1966; 1971) pointed out that these results are far from obvious in a standard neoclassical 
model. In a standard model with two goods (agricultural and manufactured) and three factors 
(resources, labor and capital), it is not obvious that resource abundance leads to greater capital intensity 
in manufacturing, since both capital and labor are scarce.  However, Krueger’s (1977) variation on this 
model (allowing for an agricultural good and two or more manufactured goods) demonstrates that a 
country with little capital may nonetheless produce quite capital-intensive manufactured goods if it is 
also well endowed with land.    12
endogenous localized technical change from Atkinson and Stiglitz (1968). These 
effects are often seen as being reinforced by the greater homogeneity of demand in the 
United States, allowing a greater degree of standardization and mechanization in the 
production process.  
 
  However, one difficulty remains the observation by Field (1985) that capital 
intensity was not higher in the United States during the nineteenth century, even in 
manufacturing. One possibility, suggested by Field, is to distinguish between overall 
capital intensity and machine intensity, since most capital was in the form of 
buildings. Another possibility, suggested by James and Skinner (1985), is to make a 
distinction between skilled and unskilled manufacturing, with greater U.S. capital (or 
machine) intensity only in the former. The distinction is based on the skill of the 
workers; only in the skilled manufacturing sector were there sufficient incentives to 
substitute capital (and resources) for labor.  
 
One problem with the James and Skinner (1985) formulation, however, is that 
there is a large literature which sees the development of mass production from the 
American system of manufactures during the second half of the nineteenth century as 
saving on the use of skilled labor (Hounshell, 1984; Braverman, 1974). Broadberry 
(1997a) uses the distinction between mass production and flexible production to 
identify parallel approaches to accumulation on the two sides of the Atlantic. In U.S. 
mass production, resource-using machinery was substituted for skilled craft labor to 
produce standardized goods. Production was therefore more machine intensive and 
more resource intensive, which suited U.S. factor supplies of abundant natural 
                                                                                                                                            
   13
resources but scarce skilled labor. In the United Kingdom flexible production retained 
a greater emphasis on customized production using skilled craft workers. This suited 
the U.K. environment of abundant skilled labor but scarce natural resources. The two 
technologies can be seen as developing in parallel, as in David’s (1975) model, and 
this is consistent with a stationary comparative labor productivity ratio in 
manufacturing as a whole over long time periods, so long as in the technologically 
lagging country imitation is possible in some industries, and competition reduces the 
size of industries where imitation is not possible. 
 
  In mining, U.S. labor productivity was less than two-thirds of the U.K. level in 
1840, but had caught up by 1870 and forged ahead after 1890. With labor productivity 
growing only very slowly in U.K. mining before 1870 and declining slightly 
thereafter, the overtaking resulted from rapid productivity growth in the United States. 
The stagnant productivity performance in U.K. mining resulted largely from 
diminishing returns in coal mining as the sector grew in response to a rapidly 
expanding demand for energy. Although capital intensity increased and technical 
progress occurred, they did little more than offset the tendency to diminishing returns 
as pits became deeper and more difficult seams were mined (Taylor, 1961; Walters, 
1975; Church, 1986: 471-496). The timing of productivity growth in the United States 
was not uniform, however, with a large jump in the 1860s and another surge during 
the 1890s. The first productivity jump may be related to the effects of the California 
gold rush in 1849 and the subsequent expansion of gold, silver, and copper mining in 
the western United States. The second productivity advance is probably related to the 
opening of the vast Lake Superior iron ore ranges (near the Great Lakes) in the late 
1880s and early 1890s (Herfindahl 1966).   14
 
  These developments in mining were an important factor in shaping U.S. 
comparative advantage in international trade during this period. Wright (1990) 
demonstrates that U.S. net exports were natural resource intensive from the 1870s 
through the 1920s. Irwin (2003) argues that the opening of the Mesabi iron ore range 
led to a sharp decline in the relative price of U.S. exports of iron and steel products, 
thus propelling a rapid expansion of those exports. In his account, this helped shift the 
United States from a net importer to a net exporter of manufactured goods for the first 
time in its history. 
 
  In construction, U.S. labor productivity was little more than half that in the 
United Kingdom in 1840, but was slightly above the U.K. level in 1890. However, the 
U.S. trend improvement in construction was much more cyclical than in mining. 
Indeed, as noted in Broadberry (1997), there appears to be a long swing pattern to 
comparative productivity in construction, with periods of boom in the U.S. building 
industry coinciding with periods of slump in the U.K. building industry. This pattern 
was first identified by Thomas (1954), and although the indicators of building activity 
in the two countries have been improved substantially since this work, the inverse 
cyclical pattern is still visible in the revised data series. The small scale of the U.S. 
productivity advantage in construction on the eve of World War I, compared with the 
position in manufacturing, suggests that there were limitations to the possibility of 
adopting high throughput methods in this sector to offset the higher wages in 
America. Indeed, construction was the one industrial sector in the United States where 
the apprenticeship system for training skilled craft workers remained important into 
the twentieth century (Bolino, 1989).   15
 
However dramatic was the improvement in comparative U.S. productivity in 
mining and construction, these sectors were a relatively small part of the overall U.S. 
overtaking of the United Kingdom because the share of the labor force employed in 
mining and construction remained small in both countries, reaching a peak of 8.1 per 
cent in the United States and 11.4 per cent in the United Kingdom in 1909/11 (Table 
4).  
 
3. Comparative productivity in services 
Table 5 examines comparative productivity in the service sector in more detail, while 
Table 6 presents data on the employment shares of. As noted earlier, data limitations 
prevent a reliable breakdown of comparative productivity levels within services for 
the period before 1870.  However, we still believe that the data are adequate to 
establish the finding that labor productivity in the service sector as a whole was 
substantially higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States during the period 
1840-1870. After the Civil War, however, U.S. productivity performance improved 
rapidly in services, catching-up to U.K. levels during the 1870s, and pulling ahead 
decisively during the 1890s.  
 
Broadberry and Ghosal (2002) link the U.S. overtaking in services to the 
application of high-volume, low-margin methods to services, beginning on the 
railroads, and moving on rapidly to other parts of the transport and utilities sector, 
with the establishment of steamship lines, urban traction systems and the telegraph 
and telephone systems (Chandler, 1977: 189-203). This resulted in U.S. overtaking in   16
transport and the utilities by 1880, and the establishment by World War I of a 
productivity lead in this sector on a scale similar to that in manufacturing.  
 
In the distribution sector, although there was a move in the direction of high 
volume business with the emergence of department stores, chain stores and mail-order 
houses, demand factors limited the diffusion of modern business enterprise. In 
particular, there were limits to the degree of centralization and standardization that 
consumers were prepared to accept, particularly given the relatively low levels of 
population density in the United States compared with the United Kingdom (Field, 
1996: 25-27).  
 
In other private services, such as banking and finance, there were obvious 
difficulties in adopting a high-volume, impersonal, standardized approach, given the 
importance of asymmetric information and trust (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Lamoreaux, 1994). The United Kingdom retained a clear advantage in this sector until 
World War I. The scale of U.K. employment in this sector was relatively large, but to 
the extent that this generated economies of scale, they must be seen as external 
economies. For the late nineteenth century, Cassis (1994) paints a convincing picture 
of the City of London as a “Marshallian district”, reaping external economies of scale 
through a network of small financial institutions.  
 
  Although government was a small part of the economy, and poses particularly 
severe measurement problems, it is included here for the sake of completeness. 
Feinstein (1972) and Lewis (1978) measure real output in this sector by assuming an 
increase in labor productivity of 0.5 per cent per annum in civil administration, but   17
not the military. This is justified on the grounds of the growing introduction of office 
machinery (Lewis, 1978: 264). Since in both countries output moves in line with 
employment, the equivalent assumption in a cross-country comparison, that 
comparative output varies in line with comparative employment, yields equal labor 
productivity in the two countries by construction. The small deviations from 100 in 
Table 5 reflect the relative importance of the military, particularly around the Boer 
War. 
 
IV. SOME CROSS CHECKS 
1. A benchmark check for 1850 
Since our estimates of comparative productivity involve projection with time series 
from a benchmark for 1910, it will be useful to construct an independent benchmark 
estimate for 1850, to act as a cross check. For the United States and Great Britain, it is 
relatively straightforward to compile the estimates of nominal G.D.P per employee 
from the sources used to construct our time series of real output and employment by 
sector, and these are provided for the whole economy, together with the three-sector 
breakdown in Table 7. The most difficult part is to obtain a price ratio to compare the 
U.S. estimates in dollars with the British estimates in pounds sterling. Our simple 
procedure here is to construct a P.P.P. for the whole economy on the basis of the 
wholesale prices of five commodities, covering wheat, raw cotton, cotton cloth, raw 
wool and coal. Using this P.P.P., we obtain an estimate of the U.S./G.B. comparative 
productivity ratio of 95.7, which is reassuringly close to the figure of 89.9 obtained by 
time series projection in Table 1.  
   18
  However, as noted earlier, it is important to take account of the difference 
between Great Britain and the United Kingdom. Accordingly, in part B of Table 7 we 
also provide an estimate of the U.S./U.K. comparative G.N.P. per head ratio in 1850 
using the P.P.P of £1 = $5.33. This yields a lower U.S./U.K ratio of 78.4, largely on 
account of the much lower labor force participation rate in the United States, an issue 
which we investigate further below. 
 
The P.P.P used in the above calculations is clearly far from ideal, and we 
would agree with the appeals of Ward and Devereux (2003) and Prados de la 
Escosura (2000) for more work on international comparisons of price levels in 
history. However, it is also important to avoid the inconsistent use of new price 
evidence by these authors, as highlighted by Broadberry (2003). To a large extent, the 
value of nominal G.D.P in historical national accounts is obtained by reflating volume 
indicators using limited price information. If the price information set is expanded, it 
is appropriate to calculate new estimates of nominal G.D.P. It is incorrect to leave the 
nominal value of G.D.P unchanged and to use the new price information to derive 
different estimates of real G.D.P. 
 
What we are able to show in Table 8 is that the P.P.P.s calculated every 
decade between 1840 and 1913 from the basic price information on these five 
commodities tracks quite closely the implied P.P.P from time series projections for 
the entire period. This means that the price information being used in our circa 1850 
benchmark is at least consistent with the price indices that have been used to 
reconstruct the nominal values of G.D.P. in the historical national accounts for these 
two countries.   19
 
2. Population, labor and comparative per capita incomes 
Our estimates have been concerned primarily with output per worker. However, the 
claims in the recent literature of U.S. superiority in the mid-nineteenth century have 
typically been couched in terms of higher levels of G.D.P. per capita. Thus Ward and 
Devereux (2003) suggest higher per capita income in the United States in 1872, while 
Prados de la Escosura (2000) shows the United States ahead as early as 1820. In fact, 
given the substantially higher share of the population in the labor force in the United 
Kingdom, shown here in Table 9, a small U.S. per capita income lead would imply 
that the United States maintained a very large lead in labor productivity. These 
authors do not provide evidence of such a lead.  
 
Indeed, since our estimates show a very small U.K. labor productivity lead 
between 1840 and 1880, the higher proportion of the population in the labor force in 
the United Kingdom translates into a rather more substantial lead in per capita income 
terms, as can be seen in the fourth column of Table 9. Thus, the United States 
overtook the Untied Kingdom in overall labor productivity by 1890, but did not 
overtake in per capita income until 1910.
6 
 
The lower share of the population in the labor force in the United States during 
the nineteenth century can be explained at least in part by demographic factors. The 
median age of the population was substantially lower in the United States than in he 
United Kingdom, where an earlier fall in fertility led to an earlier fall in the child 
dependency rate (Easterlin, 1972: 141). Whilst U.S. fertility also declined in the later   20
nineteenth century, the child dependency rate remained markedly higher and the 
proportion of the population in the labor force correspondingly lower in the United 




This paper has revisited the issue of comparative labor productivity between the 
United Kingdom and the United States in the late nineteenth century, and linked it to 
relative per capita incomes in the two countries. Building on the earlier work of 
Broadberry (1998), we push back the sectoral productivity estimates from 1870 to 
1840 and provide another cross check on the results by using an 1850 benchmark in 
addition to the 1910 benchmark. We find that U.S. labor productivity was about 95 
percent of that of the United Kingdom in 1840, about the same as it was in 1870. The 
United States already had a substantial labor productivity advantage in industry, 
particularly manufacturing, roughly comparable productivity in agriculture, and lower 
productivity in services. The United States overtook the United Kingdom in per capita 
income after the turn of the century as a result of shifting labor out of agriculture, 
raising its productivity in the service sector, and increasing the share of the population 
in the labor force. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
6 These estimates are close to those of Maddison (2003: Tables 1c and 2c) for adjacent years, despite 
the use of slightly different time series for our output based estimates. 
7 Figures from Feinstein (1972: Tables 55-56) and the U.S. Department of Commerce (1975: Series 
A119-134) show that in circa 1910, 30.6 per cent of the population was under the age of 15 in the 
United Kingdom, compared with 32.1 per cent in the United States. The corresponding figures for 1860 
were 35.0 per cent in the United Kingdom and 40.6 per cent in the United States.   21
TABLE 1: U.S./U.K. comparative labor productivity by major sectors, circa 
1840-1910 (U.K.=100) 
 
 Agriculture  Industry Services Whole 
economy
1839/41 78.1  159.7 84.8 93.8
1849/51 98.9  162.7 65.2 89.9
1859/61 100.0  152.8 73.0 95.0
1869/71 92.4  145.1 77.4 94.0
1879/81 103.9  146.3 103.6 98.1
1889/91 96.7  167.8 104.1 100.3
1899/01 112.0  170.9 116.1 114.8
1909/11 108.5  186.5 119.3 124.7
 
Notes: U.S. dates are 1839, 1849, 1859,…. U.K. dates are 1841, 1851, 1861,….. 
Time series projections based on 1909/11 benchmark. 






TABLE 2: Sectoral distribution of labor in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, circa 1850-1910 (%) 
 
A. United States 
 
 Agriculture  Industry Services
1849 60.0  17.1 22.9
1869 48.3  23.8 27.9
1889 41.6  25.5 32.9
1909 30.4  30.2 39.4
 
 
B. United Kingdom 
 
 Agriculture  Industry Services
1851 28.3  40.9 30.8
1871 22.2  42.2 35.6
1891 15.8  43.2 41.0
1911 11.8  43.5 44.7
 
Sources: U.S.: Johnston (2001: Table A-1); Kendrick (1961: Table A-VII); U.K.: 
Feinstein (1972: Table 60); Lewis (1978: Table A.4). 
   22
TABLE 3: U.S./U.K. comparative labor productivity in industry, circa 1840-1910 
(U.K.=100) 
 
 Mining  Manufacture Construction Total 
industry
1839/41 63.5  239.3 53.3 159.8
1849/51 68.3  224.9 53.6 162.7
1859/61 60.5  190.5 77.8 152.8
1869/71 102.5  182.6 64.1 145.1
1879/81 98.8  169.9 93.5 146.3
1889/91 108.5  193.6 110.3 167.8
1899/01 146.5  195.7 94.1 170.9
1909/11 161.3  201.9 133.6 186.5
 
Notes: U.S. dates are 1839, 1849, 1859,…. U.K. dates are 1841, 1851, 1861,….. 
Time series projections based on 1909/11 benchmark. 






TABLE 4: Sectoral distribution of industrial labor in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, circa 1850-1910 (% of total labor force) 
 
A. United States 
 
 Mining  Manufacture Construction Total 
industry
1849 1.2  10.9 5.0 17.1
1869 1.3  17.6 4.9 23.8
1889 2.3  18.7 4.5 25.5
1909 3.1  22.1 5.0 30.2
 
 
B. United Kingdom 
 
 Mining  Manufacture Construction Total 
industry
1851 3.1  33.3 4.5 40.9
1871 4.0  33.5 4.7 42.2
1891 5.0  33.1 5.1 43.2
1911 6.3  32.1 5.1 43.5
 
Sources: U.S.: Johnston (2001: Table A-1); Kendrick (1961: Table A-VII); U.K.: 
Feinstein (1972: Table 60); Lewis (1978: Table A.4). 
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1839/41   84.8 
1849/51   65.2 
1859/61   73.0 
1869/71 88.2  69.6 47.1 97.8 77.4 
1879/81 113.4  107.0 63.9 97.5 103.6 
1889/91 146.5  95.9 72.7 98.0 104.1 
1899/01 198.3  106.1 76.4 110.3 116.1 
1909/11 191.3  118.7 79.1 100.0 119.3 
 
Notes: U.S. dates are 1839, 1849, 1859,…. U.K. dates are 1841, 1851, 1861,….. 
Time series projections based on 1909/11 benchmark. 






TABLE 6: Sectoral distribution of service labor in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, circa 1850-1910 (% of total labor force) 
 








1849 2.4  4.4 14.4 1.7  22.9
1869 5.1  7.7 11.9 3.2  27.9
1889 7.1  9.7 12.7 3.4  32.9
1909  8.8 11.7 14.9 4.0 39.4
 
 








1851 3.0  6.2 18.4 3.2  30.8
1871 5.6  7.5 19.5 3.0  35.6
1891 7.0  9.9 20.8 3.3  41.0
1911  8.3 12.1 20.2 4.1 44.7
 
Sources: U.S.: Lebergott (1966: Table 1); Kendrick (1961: Table A-VII); Gallman 
and Weiss (1967: Table A-12); U.K.: Feinstein (1972: Table 60); Lewis (1978: Table 
A.4). 
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TABLE 7: Benchmark estimates of comparative labor productivity and per 
























 U.S. U.K. U.S./U.K. 
(U.K.=100)
G.N.P. $2,320m £633m 66.3
Population (1000s)  23,261 27,524 84.5
G.N.P. per head  $99.74 £23.0 78.4
 
Sources: Part A: U.S. G.D.P. by sector: Gallman (1960: Table A-1; Gallman and 
Weiss (1967: Table A-1); U.S. labor force: Johnston (2001: Table A-1); G.B. G.D.P.: 
Deane and Cole (1967: Table 37); Mitchell (1988: 831); G.B. labor force: Deane and 
Cole (1967: Table 31); P.P.P. derived as unweighted average of 5 commodities from 
U.S. Department of Commerce (1975) and Mitchell (1988).  
Part B: U.S. G.N.P.: Gallman (1966: Table A-1); U.S. population: U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1975: Series A-7); U.K. G.N.P.: Mitchell (1988: 831); U.K. population: 
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1840 4.36  4.92
1850 5.53  5.48
1860 4.79  5.32
1870 6.11  6.48
1880 5.88  5.33
1890 5.52  5.11
1900 5.54  5.35
1913 5.26  5.27
 
Sources: Direct estimates: unweighted average of 5 commodities from U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1975) and Mitchell (1988); Time series projections: 
benchmark P.P.P. for 1970 from Kravis et al. (1978) projected using G.D.P. deflators 
from U.K. Central Statistical Office (various issues), Feinstein (1972) and Mitchell 
(1988) for the U.K. and U.S. Department of Commerce (1992), Balke and Gordon 






TABLE 9: Labor force participation and comparative per capita incomes, circa 
1840-1910 
 
 (%)  (U.K.=100) 






 U.S.  U.K. productivity  capita  income 
1839/41 33.8  45.3 93.8 70.0 
1849/51 35.2  46.5 89.9 68.1 
1859/61 35.8  45.2 95.0 75.2 
1869/71 32.4  44.5 94.0 68.4 
1879/81 34.6  43.1 98.1 78.8 
1889/91 37.0  44.1 100.3 84.2 
1899/01 38.2  45.0 114.8 97.5 
1909/11 40.6  45.0 124.7 112.5 
 
Sources: U.S.: Lebergott (1966: Table 1); U.S. Department of Commerce (1975: 
Series A-7); U.K.: Feinstein (1972: Tables 55, 57); Deane and Cole (1967: Table 31); 





   26
APPENDIX 1: DATA FOR TIME SERIES PROJECTIONS, 1840-1910 
 
1. United States 
General sources for output by sector 
1869-1909: Kendrick (1961: Table A-IV). 
1839-1869: Gallman (1960: Table A-1). 
 
General sources for employment by sector 
1869-1909: Kendrick (1961: Table A-VII). 
1839-1869: Johnston (2001: Table A-1). The basic data from Lebergott (1966: Table 
1) have been adjusted in line with the later estimates of Weiss (1967; 1986; 1992). 
 
Additional sources and notes for specific sectors 
Agriculture: Output 1839-1869 is for narrowly defined output, excluding land 
improvements and home manufactures, for reasons of comparability with the U.K. 
Output 1869-1909 is gross output, farm segment, from Kendrick (1961: Table B-II). 
Manufacturing: Output 1859-1869 from Frickey (1947: 54) and Davis (2004: Table 
3). 
Transport & utilities: Output 1839-1869 is value added in current prices from 
Gallman and Weiss (1967: Table A-1), deflated using a weighted average of shipping 
freight rates from North (1960) and Simon (1960), and railway freight rates and 
passenger rates from Fishlow (1966).  
Distribution: Output 1839-1869 is value added in current prices from Gallman and 
Weiss (1967: Table A-1) deflated using a price deflator for distribution from Gallman 
and Weiss (1967: Table 3).  
Other private services: Output 1839-1869 is value added in current prices from 
Gallman and Weiss (1967: Table A-1), deflated using a price deflator for services 
(variant 1) from Gallman and Weiss (1967: Table 3). Hand trades and shelter 
excluded.  
Government: Output 1839-1909 derived from employment with assumption of labor 
productivity growth at 0.5 per cent per annum. 
 
2. United Kingdom 
General sources for output by sector 
1861-1911: Feinstein (1972: Table 8). 
1851-1861: Lewis (1978: Table A.3). 
1841-1851: Hoffman (1965: Table 54B). 
 
General sources for employment by sector 
1861-1911: Feinstein (1972: Table 60). 
1851-1861: Lewis (1978: Table A.4). 
1841-1851: Deane and Cole (1967: Table 31). 
 
Additional sources for specific sectors 
Agriculture: Output 1841-1851 derived from volume indicators from John (1989), 
with arable and animal husbandry weights for 1846 from p.1046.  
Construction: Output 1861-1911 is an unpublished revised index kindly made 
available by Charles Feinstein and Andrew Hilditch. 
Transport & utilities: Output 1841-1851 is an extension of the Lewis (1978) method 
using railways and shipping data from Hawke (1970) and Mitchell (1988).   27
Distribution: Output 1841-1851 is an extension of the Lewis (1978) method using 
data on agriculture, mining and manufacturing output plus imports and re-exports. 
Other private services: Output 1841-1851 is nominal value added from Deane and 
Cole (1967) deflated by the Rousseaux price index for all items from Mitchell (1988: 
722-723). 
Government: Output 1841-1861 is derived from employment with an assumption of 
labor productivity growth at 0.5 per cent per annum. 
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TABLE A1: U.S. OUTPUT DATA (1909=100) 
 
 Agric  Mining  Manuf Constr Total 
industry





1839  16.8 0.92 2.28 4.26 2.44 0.643 3.79 3.04 8.0 3.30 5.69
1849  21.1 2.23 5.85 6.31 5.47 0.972 7.58 3.93 12.7 5.41 8.54
1859  31.8 4.34 10.3 11.69 9.78 3.46 14.2 6.79 16.4 9.50 14.4
1869 36.7  9.2  16.4 15.6 15.4 6.7 14.8  10.39 22.2 12.3 18.9
1879  57.4 17.7 23.5 24.3 22.9 13.2 29.5 18.9 33.4 22.7 28.7
1889  72.6 33.8 42.2 44.1 41.5 32.9 44.3 39.3 47.0 40.4 43.9
1899  92.0 56.6 63.4 57.5 61.6 58.8 67.2 60.0 67.6 62.9 66.8
1909  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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TABLE A2: U.S. EMPLOYMENT DATA (000) 
 
1. 1839-1869 
 Agric  Mining  Manuf Constr Total 
industry






1839  3,906  32 371 290 693 86 232 778 83 1,179 5,778
1849  4,919 102 889 410 1,401 193 360  1,177 142 1,872 8,192
1859  6,330  176 1,463 520 2,159 304 614 1,691 192 2,801 11,290




 Agric  Mining  Manuf Constr Total 
industry






1869  5,758  151 2,100 580 2831 604 926 1,412 379 3321 11,910
1879  7,640  281 2,810 645 3736 816 1,232 1,674 541 4263 15,639
1889  8,996  507 4,049 964 5520 1,531 2,104 2,744 725 7104 21,620
1899  9,912  659 5,365 1,315 7339 2,075 2,892 3,650 993 9610 26,861
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TABLE A3: U.K. OUTPUT DATA (1911=100) 
 
 Agric  Mining  Manuf Constr Total 
industry





1841  110.9 15.1 18.8 31.2 19.4 8.6 18.9 21.3 19.2 17.3 25.8
1851  96.5 21.4 25.4 40.7 26.3 19.6 27.8 28.9 27.9 26.2 32.9
1861  100.0 32.1 34.6 48.3 35.6 26.6 35.2 34.1 41.9 33.4 40.6
1871  102.8 45.7 47.7 62.6 48.9 37.0 47.7 42.5 41.9 42.9 50.5
1881  98.5 58.6 57.3 75.6 59.4 46.9 57.4 54.8 48.4 53.2 59.9
1891  104.8 69.6 70.4 78.8 71.1 62.1 71.0 67.9 60.5 66.7 71.7
1901  95.8 80.7 85.6 114.6 87.7 78.7 86.0 80.0 90.3 82.6 86.1
1911  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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TABLE A4: U.K. EMPLOYMENT DATA (000) 
 
1. 1841-1851 
 Agric  Mining  Manuf Constr Total 
industry






1841  1,900  200 2,700 400 3,300 300 900 1,906 94 3,200 8,400




 Agric  Mining  Manuf Constr Total 
industry






1851  3,530  390 4,160 560 5,110 375 770 2,295 400 3,840 12,480




 Agric  Mining  Manuf Constr Total 
industry






1861  3,520  490 4,300 550 5,340 615 850 2,315 450 4,230 13,090
1871  3,120  570 4,700 660 5,930 790 1,050 2,740 420 5,000 14,050
1881  2,850  680 4,920 830 6,430 900 1,300 3,120 460 5,780 15,060
1891  2,630  840 5,520 840 7,200 1,170 1,640 3,470 550 6,830 16,660
1901  2,420 1,020 5,990 1,090 8,100 1,550 1,990 3,740 880 8,160 18,680
1911  2,400 1,290 6,550 1,030 8,870 1,700 2,460 4,120 840 9,120 20,390
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